Did the Commercial Paper Funding Facility Prevent a Great Depression Style Money Market Meltdown? by Duca, John V.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Did the Commercial Paper Funding
Facility Prevent a Great Depression Style
Money Market Meltdown?
John V. Duca
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Southern Methodist University
4. November 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29255/
MPRA Paper No. 29255, posted 5. March 2011 19:47 UTC
 
 
 
 
Did the Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
Prevent a Great Depression Style Money Market Meltdown?  
 
 
 
John V. Duca* 
Vice President and Senior Policy Advisor 
Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
P.O. Box 655906, Dallas, TX 75265 
 (214) 922-5154, john.v.duca@dal.frb.org 
and Adjunct Professor, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 
 
May 2009 (revised, February 2011) 
 
This paper analyzes how risk premia—and other factors affecting the comparative 
advantages of security-funded versus deposit-funded short-run debt—altered the relative use of 
debt funded by securities markets since the early-1960s and the relative use of commercial paper 
during the recent financial crisis. Results indicate that lower risk premia, higher information 
costs, and reserve requirement costs induce less relative use of commercial paper and short-run 
debt funded by securities markets.  This paper also finds that Federal Reserve interventions in the 
money market helped prevent the commercial paper market from melting down to the extent 
seen during the early 1930s. 
 
 
JEL Codes: E44, E50, N12 
 
Key Words: Great Depression, Commercial Paper, Financial Frictions, Credit Rationing 
 
 
 
*I thank Danielle DiMartino, Steen Ejerskov, and Gustavo Suarez for suggestions, David Luttrell 
for research assistance, and seminar participants at the European Central Bank, the 2009 Bank of 
Canada - Simon Fraser University Conference on Financial Market Stability, and the 2009 
Federal Reserve’s “Day-Ahead (of the ASSA meetings)” conference.  The views expressed are 
those of the author’s and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the 
Federal Reserve System.  
 
 
 
 
 1
This paper assesses whether Federal Reserve and Treasury efforts to improve liquidity 
conditions in money markets helped stabilize the use of commercial paper during the recent 
financial crisis.  It does this primarily by analyzing the relative use of commercial paper versus 
bank loans during the recent financial crisis along with longer time series data establishing a link 
between liquidity spreads and the relative use of debt funded by securities markets.   
Theoretical models of financial frictions imply that credit will shift from risky to safer 
borrowers if economic factors increase default risk or increase the cost of loanable funds via 
increasing liquidity risk premiums (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke and Gertler, 
1989; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996; Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Keeton, 1979; Lang and 
Nakamura, 1995; and Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  And a more recent literature has emphasized 
the vulnerability of financial firms and the financial system to liquidity risk (Adrian and Shin 
(2009, forthcoming).  Consistent with these theories, the experience of the Great Depression 
indicates that security-funded sources of external finance, such as commercial paper, are 
vulnerable to the jumps in risk premiums typical of financial crises (Duca, 2009).  Indeed, when 
spreads between corporate and treasury bond yields jumped, real commercial paper outstanding 
fell 85 percent between July 1930 and May 1933, and the relative and absolute use of bankers 
acceptances (BA’s) rose (Figure 1).  BAs are also money market instruments but unlike the 
unbacked commercial paper of that era, BA’s were collateralized and made more liquid by the 
Fed’s conduct of open market operations in BA’s.1      
Recent experience suggests that surges in risk premiums can be countered by central 
bank asset purchases which cushion the supply of security-funded credit to top-rated borrowers 
                                                          
1 BAs are time drafts drawn on banks to finance the shipment or storage of goods.  Banks guarantee payment to BA 
owners, making BAs tradeable as investors know more about banks than goods buyers.  The latter receive credit to 
pay sellers from banks which fund credits by selling BAs.  Good collateralize BAs for banks, but asset-backed paper 
is backed by paper assets whose values fell after 2006.  Using ratios of BAs and paper abstracts from other factors.   
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(see Goodhart, 1987 for a discussion on the need for a broad lender of last resort).  For example, 
real commercial paper fell 74 percent during the 25 months between July 1930 and August 1932, 
but by a less dramatic 44 percent between July 2007 and August 2009.  In contrast to the 1930s, 
the Fed has recently sought to limit surges in risk premia on high-grade commercial paper and 
residential mortgage-backed securities through several programs.  Some of the smaller decline in 
paper also reflects the stronger macroeconomic policy response in the recent crisis.  
 
To distinguish among these factors we assess the Fed’s recent unusual money market 
interventions by modeling the relative use of bank loans versus commercial paper.  This 
approach follows others who analyze the composition of business credit, dating back to Jaffee 
and Modigliani (1969 who analyze the composition of bank business loans, and extending to 
recent papers, such as Kashyap, Wilcox, and Stein (1993), who analyze the relative use of 
commercial paper and bank loans.  These studies, especially the flight-to-quality model of Lang 
and Nakamura (1995) and the financial accelerator approach of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and 
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Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), imply that the composition of credit shifts away from 
security funded debt toward deposit-funded debt during periods of high corporate risk premiums.     
We follow Kashyap, Wilcox, and Stein (1997) by modeling (1) total commercial paper 
outstanding as a share of itself plus business loans or (2) the relative use of security-funded credit 
to itself plus bank loans. The latter is partly based on Oliner and Rudebusch’s (1995) emphasis 
on a broad-based rather than a narrow (bank) -based view of the credit channel of monetary 
policy, and  uses Flow of Funds data since 1954 and covers a broad range of credit funded with 
commercial paper and other market debt.  The relative use of credit funded by commercial paper 
(e.g., commercial paper and nonbank loans funded by securities by finance companies and ABS 
lenders) versus bank intermediated credit reflects the advantages of avoiding bank regulations 
(e.g., reserve and capital requirements) relative to the advantages of banks having any 
informational/transactions cost advantages in lending and funding sources that are less exposed 
to swings in market liquidity and default risk premia.   
In this way, the relative use of security funded credit reflects the combination of insights 
from (1) an older literature emphasizing how reserve and other regulatory requirements 
encourage the use of alternatives to bank loans (e.g., Kanatas and Greenbaum, 1982), (2) the   
theoretical and empirical literature that models the securitization of bank loans (e.g., Pennacchi, 
1988), and (3) a newer literature examining the role of swings in liquidity premia and leverage in 
generating the recent financial crisis (e.g., Adrian and Shin, 2009a, 2009b, forthcoming).   With 
regard to the latter, the ability of lenders to fund loans by issuing debt—whether through 
securitization either by banks or by ABS entities—depends critically on how much collateral 
investors demand—or equivalently how much leverage markets will allow such lenders to take.  
In their model of lenders funding loans without insured deposits, Schleiffer and Vishny (2010) 
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theoretically show that such lending can dry up if investors demand higher risk premia, a point 
which Adrian and Shin (2009a,b) empirically demonstrate and which Adrian and Shin 
(forthcoming) analyze in a more market-oriented context.   
This paper also analyzes another measure of the composition of credit, (CPBLMIX), 
which is consistently defined since 2001 as a percent of commercial paper and commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loans at commercial banks.  It differs from the mix variable of Kashyap, et al 
(1997) in including all commercial paper, not just nonfinancial corporate paper.  The reason is 
the increased borrowing during the early 2000s by nonfinancial firms from financial entities who 
funded credit by issuing asset-backed paper.  The rising market share of paper-funded lending 
reflected declines in the relative use of paper directly by nonfinancial firms and of bank loans.  
The relative use of paper versus loans is affected by the relative cost of firms directly or 
indirectly borrowing from securities markets (avoiding bank regulatory costs) versus borrowing 
from banks relying on insured deposits.  Thus, when the collateral value of assets backing asset-
backed paper became less valuable when financial risk premia rose in the crisis, the relative 
funding costs advantages and use of commercial paper fell (Gorton and Metrick, 2009).   
Indeed, between July 2007 (before the hedge fund event of August 2007) and the failure 
of Lehman Brothers, the relative use of commercial paper fell 10 percentage points when the 
spread between the Baa corporate and 10-year Treasury yield rose by 1.5 percentage points 
(Figure 2).  After the Fed announced its commercial paper purchase program in October 2008, 
spreads rose by a larger 2-3 percentage points while the paper-mix variable fell by a smaller 6-8 
percentage points by July 2009.  Results indicate that this is not a coincidence, implying that new 
Federal Reserve programs helped prevent commercial paper from imploding by as much as it did 
in the 1930s. Section 2 reviews factors affecting the relative use of commercial paper (and 
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security-funded debt) versus bank loans and variables tracking those factors.  Section 3 presents 
the empirical results using quarterly data back to the early 1960s, while Section 4 analyzes 
higher frequency monthly data that that are consistently available since 2001.  Results are 
interpreted in Section 5, which draws parallels with the experience of the 1930s.   
 
2.  Specifications and Data 
2A. Modeling the Relative Use of Commercial Paper-Funded versus Deposit-Funded Loans 
  The long-run relative use of commercial paper-funded credit (CPFC) can be modeled as 
a function of nonstationary (X vector) and stationary (Y vector) regulatory and risk variables 
reflecting the factors mentioned above.  Short-run changes in CPFC can be modeled as a 
function of an error-correction term (EC ≡ actual minus equilibrium log-levels of CPFC), short-
run variables, and first-differences of any nonstationary X components: 
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      log(CPFC) = λ0 + λ 1log(X)  + λ 2(Y) 
      log(CPFC)t = 0 + 1log(EC)t-1+ βilog(CPFC)t-i+  θilog(X)t-i + δYt  
      EC ≡ log(CPFC) – [λ0 + λ 1log(X)]  .     (1) 
 This approach can be implemented with enough time series data.  Unfortunately, the only 
consistent and long-running time series source of data to track CPFC into the recent crisis period 
is the quarterly Flow of Funds data base. Higher frequency monthly data on commercial paper 
that span direct and asset-back commercial paper suffer from sample breaks, and are consistently 
available only since 2001.  This makes it difficult to identify long-run relationships and short 
samples are plagued by short-run trends. Monthly data on the use of commercial paper relative to 
bank loans (CPBLMIX) are modeled over 2001:02-2009:09 using a simple first difference model: 
      log(CPBLMIX)t = 0 + βilog(CPBLMIX)t-i+  θilog(X)t-i + δYt   (2) 
2B. Data and Variables 
Variables track the following types of factors: the use of security-funded credit, reserve 
requirements, information/transactions costs, capital requirements, risk premia, credit market 
interventions, disintermediation and deregulation, and monthly event risk and inventory demand. 
Relative Use of Commercial Paper-Funded Credit 
 Two measures of the relative use of commercial paper-funded credit are analyzed.  The 
first, CPFC, is a ratio of quarterly Flow of Funds data on nonfinancial corporate debt since 
1960:q1 (Figure 2).  CPFC equals the sum of directly issued commercial paper plus finance 
company loans plus other loans financed by asset-backed commercial paper (securitized C&I 
loans help by ABS issuers and loans by ABS issuers to nonfinancial corporate business) divided 
by the sum of directly issued commercial paper, bank loans and all other loans (the last category 
includes finance company loans and asset-backed securities (ABS)-funded loans).   
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The regression models start in 1961:q1, owing to some prior sample breaks stemming 
from shifts in underlying source data that cause discrete shifts in CPFC in the late 1950s.  
Several changes were made to Flow of Funds data collected after 1973:q1 which likely led to 
quarterly models of first differences of CPFC having a large outlier in that quarter.  To control 
for this a 0-1 dummy (Break1973q1) was included in all short-run quarterly models. 
 The other measure of security-funded credit, CPBLMIX¸ is the ratio of domestic issued 
commercial paper to itself plus bank loans (Figure 2).  The numerator includes commercial 
paper issued by financial corporations to track asset-backed commercial paper that largely 
funded loans to nonfinancial corporations.  A drawback of CPBLMIX is that its commercial 
paper component funds consumer credit.  To address this, an alternative, corresponding set of 
models was estimated in which the bank loan component of an alternative mix variable includes 
consumer loans held on bank balance sheets.    
Tracking the Burden of Reserve Requirements 
The reserve requirement tax can be proxied by nominal interest rates up until when the 
Fed started paying interest on reserves in 2008:q4.  However, the 3-month T-bill rate (3monTR) 
was I(2) rather than I(1) (an X variable) over the post-Treasury Accord era, but has the drawback 
of ignoring substantial changes in reserve requirements. A more precise measure calculates the 
reserve requirement tax (RRTAX) as the product of the 3-month T-bill rate and the highest 
reserve requirement (Figure 3) on banks in central reserve city banks (mainly large banks), with 
an adjustment for the advent of sweep accounts (Anderson and Rasche, 2001; Dutkowsky and 
Cynamon, 2003) that shift balances overnight out of reservable checking accounts into MMDAs 
to help avoid the implicit reserve requirement tax.   The adjustment equals one minus the ratio of 
swept balances to the sum of swept balances (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2010), 
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reservable demand deposits, and reservable other checkable deposits.  The adjustment is 
internally consistent with the calculation of the reserve requirement tax in that the estimated 
reduction in required reserves balances of about 10 percent of sweep balances (St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Bank, 2010) roughly equals the maximum 10 percent marginal reserve requirement for 
large banks, the ratio used to gauge the reserve requirement tax.   Near zero short-term Treasury 
bill rates and the payment of roughly similar interest on reserves since 2008:q4, the reserve 
requirement tax equals 0.01 percent over 2008:q4 to 2009:q4. 
 
Tracking Long-Run Information and Transactions Costs 
The most generally accepted view of factors affecting the relative importance of banks 
emphasizes not only the burden of regulations like reserve requirements, but also how the 
informational and transactions cost advantages of banks over nonbanks have eroded over time 
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owing to improvements in technology (e.g., Edwards and Mishkin, 1995, and Mishkin, 2009).   
Studies of the rising importance of mutual funds emphasize the role played by declining 
transactions costs at nonbanks, which stem from improvements in overall financial sector 
productivity (Duca, 2000 and 2005).  To parsimoniously model the influence of general declines 
in information costs that likely capture declines in transactions costs, long-run models include a 
measure of information technology prices.  Annual data on the quality-adjusted information 
technology price index of Jorgenson and Stiroh (2007) were interpolated into quarterly readings 
using a cubic spline, and were then deflated by the overall GDP chain price deflator.  Annual 
price readings for 2007-2009 extend the Jorgenson-Stiroh annual data beyond 2006 by assuming 
that nominal prices continued falling at the 4.69 percent pace observed over 2003-06.  The 
resulting series, RPIT (Figure 4), should be negatively related to the security-funded share of 
business credit because declines in this real, relative price should generally reflect the factors that 
reduce the informational and transactions cost advantages of bank over nonbank intermediaries.  
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Tracking the Burden of Capital Requirements 
 For the longer-sample models of CPFC, there is a need to account for shifts in capital 
requirements on banks, with higher burdens expected to increase the security-funded share of 
business credit.  To control for the Basel 1 capital standards, a 0-1 variable equal to 1 between 
the 1990q1 implementation of the Basel 1 capital accords up through the 2006:q2 announcement 
of how the Basel 2 capital requirements were to be implemented by U.S. regulators (Basel1Ann).  
Since Basel 1 implies higher burdens on banks, Basel1Ann is expected to have a positive sign 
(see Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Berger and Udell (1994) on Basel 1’s role in the credit 
crunch of the early 1990s).   
Although the international accord on Basel 2 was announced in 2004, U.S. regulators 
delayed implementation and delayed announcing details about how it would be implemented in 
the U.S. until the spring of 2006.  To control for Basel 2, a 0-1 variable (Basel2Ann) equal to 1 
since 2006:q2 was included in some cointegrating vectors (not shown).  The separate treatment 
of Basel 1 and 2 is based on the view that the risk management provisions for very large banks 
effectively lowered the capital requirements from Basel 1 levels.  This implies Basel 2 marked an 
aggregate easing of bank capital standards, particularly because the small number of banks 
eligible for using internal risk management models held the vast majority of bank loans in the 
U.S. by the mid-2000s. Accordingly, Basel2Ann is expected to have a less positive coefficient 
than Basel2Ann.  In other runs not shown in the tables, 0-1 variables based on Basel 
announcement dates were tried, but performed less well than variables based on implementation-
dates.  But Basel2Ann proved insignificant and is dropped from the models shown in Table 1.   
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Tracking Corporate Risk Premia 
In principle money market risk premia could proxy the liquidity benefits of the safety net 
to banks.  However, in practice, simultaneity issues arise, especially after the Fed announced the 
commercial paper funding facility (CPFF) in late October 2008.   Instead, liquidity and default 
risk are tracked by spreads between yields on Aaa-rated corporate and 10-year Treasury bonds 
(Aaa10TR) based on the view that this yield spread mainly reflects liquidity risk premiums.  
Yield spreads between A-rated corporate and default free Treasury bonds (A10TR) reflect a 
combination of swings in default and liquidity risk premiums (Jaffee, 1975).  The former 
performed better in long-run, low-frequency quarterly models of CPFC, while the latter had 
information content in the higher frequency monthly models of CPBLMIX.   
Wider spreads are less a threat to the funding of bank loans, as banks had access to 
insured deposits and Fed liquidity facilities before mid-October 2008.  As a result, the price and 
non-price terms of commercial paper likely rise relative to those of bank loans, implying a 
negative relationship between the commercial paper share of short-term business credit and the 
corporate yield spread in levels and first differences (Figure 5).  The Aaa-10 year Treasury yield 
spread jumped in late 2008 (Figure 4), nearing the highs of the Great Depression.   
The 3-month TED (LIBOR- T-bill rate) spread is added to CPBLMIX regressions in case 
LIBOR market conditions notably affect the loan component of CPBLMIX.  But because paper 
issuers usually have back-up bank lines of credit, LIBOR swings likely affect the mix variable 
less than corporate bond risk premia.2  Nevertheless there may be some marginal information in 
                                                          
2 For global contagion in the LIBOR market, see Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2010a).  For the impact of Fed 
actions on the LIBOR market, see Armantier, et al. (2008), Williams and Taylor (2009), and Wu (2008). For 
information on Fed credit programs , see www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/recentactions.htm,  
www.newyorkfed.org/markets/Forms_of_Fed_Lending.pdf , and www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm.  
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the TED spread since bond and TED spreads have moved differently (Figure 6).  (This variable 
mattered more in monthly models than in quarterly models). 
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Credit Market Intervention Variables 
To model the impact of Federal Reserve and Treasury actions and announcements, 
interactive variables are tested.  Monthly variables multiply the change in a corporate bond yield  
spread (A10TR or Aaa10TR) and a dummy (FP) equal to 1 between October 2008 and July 2009, 
and 0 otherwise. The dummy is designed to proxy for the combined effects of three Federal 
Reserve and Treasury initiatives.  The first was the Treasury’s extension of deposit insurance to 
many money market mutual funds.  The second was the Fed’s decision to create a new funding 
facility that would lend to depository institutions in order for them to purchase ABCP from 
money funds experiencing significant redemption pressures. This was done to help prevent 
money-fund redemptions from setting off a disorderly sale of commercial paper into an unsettled 
also announced it would fund purchases of top-rated commercial paper via a new facility 
supported by the Treasury—the commercial paper funding facility (CPFF) until January 2010.   
market.  Because this action was unlikely to fully alleviate increased uncertainty that firms might 
be unable to issue new paper to repay maturing debt if investors became too risk averse, the Fed  
Under this back-stop facility, directly-issued three-month A1/P1-rated paper is purchased 
at a rate equal to the three-month OIS rate plus 100 basis points, and if the issuer provides 
insufficient collateral, OIS plus 200 basis points.  Unsecured asset-backed, A1/P1-rated paper is 
purchased at a rate equal to the three-month OIS rate plus 300 basis points.   Shortly following 
the announcement of the facility, the commercial paper-Treasury bill spread fell back toward 
normal levels (Figure 7). Owing to the penalty discount pricing, CPFF holdings of paper 
accumulated in a crisis will reverse with a short lag as a financial crisis unwinds.  In this way, the 
CPFF has less marginal effect on the composition of credit when crisis conditions in the paper 
market return to normal.  To capture this feature, the 0-1 variable (FP) equals 1 in the months 
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(October 2008 to July 2009) or the quarters 2008:q4-2009:q3 when the Fed held at least 10 
percent of total U.S.-issued commercial paper. In principle, the variable FP may also capture 
market return to normal.  To capture this, the 0-1 variable (FP) equals 1 in the months (October 
2008 to July 2009) or quarters 2009:q1-2009:q2 (2008:q4 omitted owing to the use of the t-1 lag 
of liquidity premiums) when the Fed held at least 10 percent of total U.S.-issued commercial 
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would better align with the ongoing aspects of those of other facilities.  Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to completely disentangle the effects of other facilities. 
Reflecting that such actions may cushion the impact of higher liquidity and default risk 
pressures, the interactive term FP *A10TR is expected to have a sign opposite from a non-
interactive yield spread.  These expected signs assume that the net effect of Fed and Treasury 
actions to improve money market and banking system conditions had larger short-run cushioning 
effects on commercial paper market than on bank loans, which, a priori, is an empirical issue.  
Owing to the use of lower frequency data in the quarterly models, the impact of these 
programs is modeled by inter-acting the t-1 level of the Aaa-10 yr. Treasury yield spread with 
the t-1 lag of a quarterly dummy FPQ that equals 1 over 2009:q4 2009:q2. This interactive 
variable either enters by itself or is subtracted from the Aaa-Treasury spread, which effectively 
zeroes out the spread during the intervention period.  Another quarterly model also enters FPQ 
as a non-interacted, intercept shift term.  
Under another liquidity program, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
(TALF) which was started after a long delay in March 2009 (announced in December 2009), the 
Fed purchases top-tier rated asset-backed medium-term debt that funds several types of loans, 
included business loans backed by the Small Business Administration, equipment loans, credit 
cards, student loans, and auto loans.  In this program, issuers voluntarily approach the facility for 
funding after packaging such securities in accordance with the terms of the program.  The start of 
TALF in March 2009 was accompanied by a revival of commercial paper issuance that later 
ebbed in April.  Indeed, in all the models March 2009 was a large, positive outlier that largely 
unwound in April.   Paper issuers and investors may have held misplaced hopes that the TALF 
would help improve liquidity conditions in the commercial paper market for two reasons.  First, 
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reports indicated that markets were disappointed by the low initial volumes of TALF purchases.  
Second, and more importantly, the TALF was designed mainly to improve liquidity conditions in 
medium-term asset-backed securities used to fund consumer and business loans over the 
medium-, not the very short-run.  The liquidity problems arising during the financial crisis has 
fostered some segmentation of securities markets (and was a major rationale for asset market 
interventions by the Fed and Treasury) that plausibly limited spill-over effects of the TALF on 
the commercial paper market.  Some monthly models include, ΔTALF, equal to 1 in March 2009, 
-1 in April, and 0 otherwise.  Comparing models 3 with 4 and models 7 with 8, including ΔTALF 
cleans up residuals without altering key coefficient estimates other than the TED spread. 
Quarterly Regulation Q Disintermediation and Deregulation Variables 
During the era of Regulation Q ceilings on deposit rates offered by banks, banks lost 
market share to commercial paper and security funded lenders when market interest rates rose 
above deposit rate ceilings.  The inability of banks to offer interest rates in line with market 
interest rates induced households and other investors to shift funds out of banks, thereby 
inducing banks to tighten their credit standards, consistent with the findings of Duca, 
Muellbauer, and Murphy (2010b).  One variable to track these effects is Duca’s (1996) measure 
of how much Regulation Q ceilings on deposit interest rates were binding until Regulation Q 
ceilings were lifted in the early 1980s. REGQ controls for short-run disintermediation effects not 
tracked by interest rates or measures of the user cost of capital (Duca and Wu, 2009), which are 
likely to increase the security-funded share of credit at the expense of the bank-funded share.    
 One innovation around these ceilings was the creation of money market mutual funds 
(MMMFs) in 1971 in the U.S. which could pay market-determined interest rates.  These funds 
were not really notable until about 1973 and check-writing features on MMMFs for households 
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were introduced in the late spring of 1974 by Fidelity.  By giving investors an option to purchase 
a more liquid form of commercial paper, the rise of money market funds lowered the costs of 
funding commercial paper and other forms of open market paper relative to banks.  Partly to 
counteract this drain on the banking system, banks were allowed to offer money market deposit 
accounts starting in 1982:q4.  This resulted in inflows into bank deposits from both MMMFs and 
other assets that were large enough to positively affect money demand (Duca, 2000) and the 
availability of bank loans (see Aron, et. al, 2010).  To control for these two innovations in a 
parsimonious way, a variable (MMAdvantage) is included that equals 1 over 1974:q3-1982:q3, a 
period when security-funded business credit was positively affected by the presence of MMMFs 
and the absence of MMDAs.  In addition, because MMDAs received inflows from nonMMMF 
assets, an additional dummy (DMMDA), equal to 1 in 1982:q4, is included to control for 
substitution from non-MMMF sources when MMDAs first became available.    
Monthly Event Risk and Inventory Variables 
To handle unusual event risks that boosted liquidity risk in the short-sample monthly 
models, these models include a dummy (Aug9 = 1 in 2007:08,  = 0 otherwise) for the market 
reaction to the August 9, 2007 decision by some European hedge funds to halt redemptions, 
owing to the lack of market trades on their subprime mortgage-related assets.  This induced a 
surge in LIBOR-OIS and LIBOR-Treasury spreads that was not immediately picked up by a 
surge in corporate bond yield spreads or the t-1 lag of the TED spread.  On similar grounds, a 
dummy for the September 2008 failure of Lehman (Lehman = 1 in 2008:09, 0 otherwise) is also 
included.  Finally, reflecting that commercial paper issuance (and hence CPBLMIX) is more 
dependent on the need to finance inventories (Kashyap, Wilcox, and Stein, 1993), regressions 
also included the log of the monthly ISM purchasing managers’ (manufacturing) index of 
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inventory demand, which tracks the change in inventories and is more timely than inventory-
shipment ratio data and much less subject to revisions (LINVISM).  In the “broad mix” 
alternative, the ISM index for inventories is replaced with the log of the overall ISM index 
(LINV), which is more reflective of manufacturing output in general.  This is advantageous 
because the consumer loan component of bank loans is linked to consumer spending, particularly 
on manufactured items that are in the credit-sensitive durable part of consumer spending.  Note 
that the timing of the ISM survey is early in a month, and tends to reflect activity in month t-1 
(Harris, 1991).  Thus, simultaneity is not much of an issue since using the time t dated index 
essentially reflects activity in period t-1.  Furthermore, the index is used as a scaling variable to 
control for the influence of inventory swings on the mix variable. 
In the short monthly sample in which commercial paper data are consistently defined 
(2001:01-09:09), the paper-mix and bond yield spread variables are I(2), reflecting that at the 
sample’s end, the paper mix plunges while the bond yield spreads soar, leading to serial 
correlation in both levels and first differences at the sample’s end.  To limit such distortions, the 
models regress first differences of the paper-loan mix on first differences of yield spreads for 
lags t-1 through t-3 in the presence of control variables (Aug9, Lehman, and LINVISM/LISM).  In 
quarterly models, the one-quarter lag of the first difference of the quarterly average level of this 
index had the largest information content of the quarterly permutations tried. 
3. Results From Quarterly Models of the Security-Funded Short-Run Credit Mix (CPFC) 
 Cointegration models of the security-funded short-run credit mix variable (CPFC) were 
run owing to unit roots in CPFC, the reserve requirement tax, and the information technology 
price series.  Four models are presented which have a common sample period of 1961:q1-
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2009:q4 to avoid sample breaks in the 1950s data from changes in Flow of Funds sampling and 
methodological steps.   
As shown in the upper-panel of Table 1, all four models include the reserve requirement 
tax and the real price of information technology as long-run endogenous variables in the 
cointegrating vector. Because some regulatory variables were long-lasting, namely Basel1Ann (t-
1 and MMAdvantage(t-1)), they were included in the cointegrating vector to more accurately 
gauge long-run relationships.  With the exception of how credit market intervention variables are 
modeled, the same set of short-run exogenous variables are included to handle shorter term 
regulatory effects (REGQ(t-2) and DMMDA(t), and the stationary (Aaa-10 yr. Treasury bond 
yield spread to control for short-run shocks in liquidity risk premiums.   
The models differ in how they model credit market interventions by the Fed and 
Treasury.  The baseline model (Model 1) ignores these interventions.   The second model 
essentially assumes that the Fed’s CPFF program effectively neutralized any effect of liquidity 
risk in 2009:q1 and 2009:q2.  It replaces the Aaa-Treasury spread with the difference between 
Aaa10TR and Aaa10TR multiplied by the dummy FPQ, which equals 1 in the first two quarters 
of 2009.  The third model retains Aaa10TR, but adds the product, Aaa10TR*FPQ as a separate 
variable.  The fourth model simply adds FPQ as a stand-alone variable.  
Each model is estimated using Johansen (1991, 1995) procedure to estimate cointegrating 
vectors for the log-level of CPSH in the first stage, from which error-correction terms are 
constructed for use in a second step VAR in first differences for modeling short-run movements 
(log first differences) in CPSH.    For each model unique and statistically significant 
cointegrating vectors are estimated, allowing for deterministic trends in the long-run variables, 
but not in the cointegrating vector.  All models used a lag length of 6 quarters that yielded 
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significant and unique cointegrating vectors and clean residuals, and minimized the AIC statistic. 
Note that unique and significant vectors can be found allowing for linear and quadratic time 
trends in the cointegrating vector and also not allowing for any time trend in the vector nor 
deterministic trends in the long-run variables.  In each model, the implied equilibrium 
relationships indicate a statistically significant and positive relationship between the reserve 
requirement tax and the nonbank share of lending to nonfinancial businesses.  As expected, the 
Basel 1 and money fund advantage variables had statistically significant and positive 
coefficients. Also, as expected, there is a negative relationship between the real price of 
information technology and the nonbank share of business credit.  Higher IT prices suggest that 
information is more costly and transactions costs are higher, ceteris paribus.  By implication, 
bank informational and transactions cost advantages over nonbank intermediaries are greater as 
IT prices are higher. 
The short-run models of the change in the nonbank share of business credit take into 
account the long-run relationships by including an error-correction term equal to the t-1 gap of 
the actual level of security-funded debt share minus the estimated long-run equilibrium.  Across 
the short-run models shown in the lower-panel of Table 1, the error-correction coefficients are 
highly significant, with an expected negative sign.  Thus, if actual nonbank share exceeded its 
equilibrium in time t-1, this would exert a negative impact on the time t change in the nonbank 
share, as one would expect.  The speeds of adjustment are similar, implying that roughly 20 
percent of disequilibria are eliminated on average per quarter.  This speed is sensible given the 
large structural shifts in the security market-funded share of business credit over the past 5 
decades.  The regulatory variables are all significant with the expected signs.  The 
disintermediation (REGQ) had significantly negative effects on the security market-funded share 
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of nonfinancial business credit.  Finally and as expected, the wider liquidity premium spreads as 
reflected in the Aaa-10 yr. Treasury spread have a negative effect, which is on the border of 
significance or marginal significance across the four models.   
Using the estimates from the cointegrating vector for the baseline model (model 1) and 
adding the implied long-run effects of the other variables (coefficient divided by the speed of 
adjustment—i.e., the coefficient on the EC term), one can construct an implied equilibrium share 
of security-funded lending.   This is done using the baseline model.  As shown in Figure 8, this 
equilibrium series lines up well with the actual log share, and tends to slightly lead it, consistent 
with the sign of the error-correction term. 
 
With respect to the impact of the policy interventions, quarterly evidence indicates that 
any detectable effects were weak.  In model 2, the liquidity spread that is directly adjusted with 
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the CPFF dummy is barely more significant than the regular spread in model 1, with barely any 
improvement in fit and perhaps a slightly faster speed of adjustment.  In model 3, which includes 
the regular Aaa spread and the spread multiplied by the FPQ intervention dummy, the interactive 
term is positive, but statistically insignificant.  This indicates that only a weak effect could be 
detected.  In model 4, the speed somewhat faster than those of models 1-3.  However, the 
separately entered FPQ variable, while positive, is not statistically significant.   
Overall, quarterly results suggest that the policy interventions did little to stabilize the 
security-funded share of nonfinancial business debt.  Nevertheless, the Fed actions were 
primarily geared towards aiding the commercial paper market, and thus should probably not be 
gauged by their detectable effects on the security-funded debt share used in this paper.  
Furthermore, the quarterly models suffer from having a low frequency.  More specifically, any 
policy intervention effects could only be identified with limited degrees of freedom using this 
sample (really just 2 out of nearly 200 quarterly observations) and these interventions were not 
really tried before in the U.S.  For this reason, models using monthly data and that are more 
focused on the relative use of commercial paper are more suitable to assess the impact of the 
money market interventions by the Fed and the Treasury. The long-horizon models do, however, 
establish that liquidity risk can negatively affect the reliance of businesses for loans from 
security-market funded sources which lack(ed) the government safety net backing bank funding. 
4. Results From Monthly Models of the Paper-Bank Loan Mix During the Crisis 
Table 2 presents eight monthly regressions based on eq. (2) using different sample 
periods and mix definitions, and which use first differences of the yield spread between A-rated 
corporate and 10 yr. Treasury bonds.  Table 3 presents similar results using first differences of 
the Aaa-Treasury spread, and in general, the qualitative results are similar but the model fits are 
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tighter using the A-Treasury spread.  The results in Table 2 are more comparable in this 
dimension to the results of the related study of the Great Depression (Duca, 2010), while those 
from Table 3 are similar to the results in section 3 of this study that use the Aaa-Treasury spread. 
Note that the qualitative findings in Table 1 were also unchanged when the A-Treasury spread 
replaced the Aaa-Treasury spread (table available upon request). 
The discussion will focus on Table 2’s results. Models (1)-(4) use the narrow mix 
variable (CPBLMIX), while models (5)-(8) use broader (CPBCLMIX) index and the broader ISM 
index, but otherwise correspond to models (1)-(4) with respect to sample periods and variables.  
Model 1 covers the sample through October 2008 and omits controls for Federal Reserve and 
Treasury programs.  The ISM indexes have positive, but not always significant coefficients.3  As 
expected, the t-1 and t-3 lags of ATR are negative and significant (the t-2 lag is insignificant) in 
Model 1, as are the financial crisis dummies (Aug9 and Lehman).  However, extending the 
sample to September 2009, the t-1 lag of ATR is no longer significant in Model 2.  This change 
suggests that the CPFF affected the impact of risk premiums on the relative use of commercial 
paper and bank loans.  
To shed more light on that hypothesis, models 3, 4, 7, and 8 are estimated over the full 
sample and include a 0-1 variable (FP) for the liquidity programs multiplied by ATR.  The 
inclusion of these terms yields non-interactive rate spread coefficients that are similar to those in 
samples ending in October 2008, and interactive rate spreads (FP*ATR) that are jointly 
significant.  In particular, the interactive rate spread coefficients at lags t-1 and t-3 are highly 
statistically significant and oppositely signed from the non-interactive rate spreads, consistent 
                                                          
3 Note that owing to little variation in the inventory diffusion index in the short sample ending in 2008:08, it is 
difficult to identify an effect of inventories.  However, in the longer sample, the inventory variable mainly has a 
positive and at least marginally statistically significant coefficient, consistent with the general use of commercial 
paper to finance working capital (such as inventories) and the results of Kashyap, Wilcox, and Stein (1993). 
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with liquidity programs having a desired effect.  One caveat is that March 2009 is a big enough 
positive outlier, that there is evidence of serial correlation in the residuals for all the full sample 
models (2, 3, 6, and 7) that omit the TALF program variable.  This problem appears corrected by 
the presence of the ΔTALF variable in the interactive-spread models (4 and 8).  The overall 
patterns of results suggest that the Federal Reserve and Treasury liquidity programs have helped 
stabilize the relative use of commercial paper by countering the influence of wider liquidity and 
default risk premiums. Nevertheless this interpretation and the findings as a whole should be 
viewed with caution in light of the short sample, which makes it infeasible to estimate error-
correction models using monthly data with cointegration techniques that may more fully reflect 
the short- and long-run influences of securities market conditions on credit flows. 
During the early 1930s, the Federal Reserve did not actively intervene in commercial 
paper purchases when commercial paper plunged in tandem with rising corporate liquidity and 
default risk premiums, even after it was granted discretion to do so in the summer of 1932 in an 
amendment (section 13(3)) of the Federal Reserve Act.  In contrast to that episode, the Federal 
Reserve has intervened to provide liquidity in the commercial paper market during the current 
crisis, especially since October 2008.  By itself, the evidence from this sub-section is subject to 
major qualifications owing to the short monthly sample.  Nevertheless, when combined with the 
previous sub-section’s findings from long quarterly samples covering nearly one-half century,  
the overall results are consistent with the hypothesis that money market interventions helped 
stabilize the use of commercial paper by countering rising corporate risk premiums. 
5. Conclusion 
 This study analyzes money market conditions during the current financial crisis, partly 
drawing on some limited parallels with the collapse of commercial paper use during the Great 
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Depression.  Consistent with Bernanke (1983) and the pre-World War II studies of Kimmel 
(1939) and Young (1932), evidence in a related study (Duca, 2009) indicates that the provision 
of credit shifted towards debt whose funding sources were less vulnerable to liquidity shocks 
associated with swings in credit risk premia during the Great Depression.  The findings are also 
consistent with the view that changes in financial technology, regulations, and risk premia on 
private debt affect the relative use of traditional deposit funded loans and nontraditional sources 
of credit as stressed in various strands of the money and banking literature (Mishkin, 2009; 
Greenbaum and Kanatas, 1982; and Adrian and Shin, 2009a, inter alia).  And from a broader 
perspective, results provide additional empirical support for Adrian and Shin’s (2009b) emphasis 
that “banking and capital market developments are inseparable.” 
The findings of the current study illustrate the continued importance of analyzing the 
composition of short-term business credit—especially during the recent financial crisis.  In 
particular, up until the Fed and Treasury actions of October 2008, when corporate-Treasury bond 
yield spreads rose, the use of security-markets funded commercial paper fell relative to bank 
business loans, which could be funded with insured deposits.  This linkage broke down after Fed 
and Treasury’s announcements to buy commercial paper, provide discount loans to money 
market funds, and insure money market fund accounts.   The pre-October 2008 pattern and the 
ensuing break from it suggest that the 2008 pullback in commercial paper outstanding owed to 
spikes in default and liquidity premiums.  This interpretation is plausible because higher risk 
premiums on commercial paper are amenable to being addressed by the money market 
interventions of the Fed and the Treasury.  Thus far, these actions appear to have prevented an 
even sharper fall in commercial paper and helped foster a reversal of the jump in the commercial 
paper-Treasury bill spread after the failure of Lehman.  
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Such an interpretation is qualified by the short sample available for analyzing monthly 
data and because the financial crisis is not yet over.   Nevertheless, the monthly impacts of rate 
spread variables on the relative use of commercial paper were estimated in the presence of some 
controls for credit demand, and commercial paper volumes began rising during the summer of 
2009.  In addition, some of the beneficial effects of the commercial paper funding facility may be 
hard to disentangle from complementary effects of other efforts to bolster liquidity in credit 
markets.  Nevertheless, the monthly evidence is consistent with findings from long quarterly 
samples spanning crises over the last 50 years that corporate credit risk premiums negatively 
affect the use of security-funded credit.  The qualification is that these interventions had weak 
estimated effects using quarterly data that may be of too low a frequency to econometrically 
detect any quarterly effect.  With appropriate caveats, findings suggest that new liquidity 
programs in the U.S. have, thus far, helped prevent the money markets from melting down by as 
fast as they did during the early 1930s.   
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Table 1: Quarterly Error-Correction Models of the Change in the Security-Funded Share of NonFinancial 
Corporate Short-Term Debt (1961:2-2009:4, 9 quarter lag length) 
 
A. Long-Run Equilibrium Relationships: lnCPFC = λ 0 + λ 1lnRRTAX+ λ 2lnRPIT 
        Sample:   61:1-09:4   61:1-09:4 61:1-09:4 61:1-08:2   
Variable    Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
 
Constant      2.2681     2.2564   2.2406   2.2388  
 
lnRRTAXt-1      0.0542**      0.0483**   0.0419**   0.0417**  
        (3.65)     (3.36)   (2.76)    (2.76)  
    
lnRPITt-1     -0.3239**   -0.3182**  -0.3106**  -0.3097**  
       (-23.83)   (-25.00)    (-25.55)  (-25.65) 
 
MMadvantage t-1     0.1497**      0.1565**   0.1656**   0.1665**  
        (5.04)     (5.59)   (6.27)    (6.34)  
 
Basel1 t-1         0.1497**      0.0905**   0.0961**   0.0973**  
       (5.04)     (3.26)   (3.35)    (3.40)   
Eigenvalue (1 vector)     0.1769               0.1754   0.1751              0.1754             
Eigenvalue (2 vectors)    0.1071               0.1055   0.0916              0.0925        
Trace Stat.  (1 vector)   76.47190**   75.1256** 73.4666** 73.9234**  
Trace Stat.  (2 vectors)   38.31127   37.3225 35.7288 36.1162  
Max-Eigen (1 vector)   38.1606**   37.8031** 37.7378** 37.8072**  
Max-Eigen (2 vectors)   22.20003   21.8611 18.8300 19.0188 
 
B. Short-Run Equilibrium Relationships 
lnCPFC t = 0 + 1log(EC)t-1+ βilog(CPFC)t-i+  θilog(X)t-i + δYt 
Variable   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Constant    0.0138** 0.0136**  0.0138** 0.0138**  
(2.99)  (2.97)   (2.98)  (2.99) 
 
ECt-1    -0.1975** -0.2140** -0.2302** -0.2315**    
      (-5.24) (-5.35)   (-5.39) (-5.39)      
 
AAATR10t-1 (x100)  -0.7057*    -0.6354* -0.6305*    
      (-2.37)     (-2.19) (-2.17)      
 
AAATR10t-1     -0.7050* 
-FPQ* AAATR10t-1 (x100)    (-2.43) 
 
FPQ* AAATR10t-1 (x100)     1.8668 
        (0.88) 
 
FPQ t          0.0174 
          (0.92) 
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REGQ t-2 (x100)  0.8322**   0.8158** 0.7979** 0.7952** 
     (3.12)    (3.06)   (2.98)    (2.97)  
 
DMMDA t-1   -0.0884** -0.0882** -0.0884** -0.0887**    
      (-4.29) (-4.30)   (-4.29) (-4.31)   
 
ΔISMINVENTt-1 (x100) 0.0546    0.0549 0.0576   0.0582 
     (1.16)    (1.17)   (1.22)    (1.23)  
 
 Break1973q1t   -0.0906** -0.0901** -0.0903** -0.0903** 
     (-4.08)  (-4.08)  (-4.06)  (-4.06) 
 
ΔlnCPFCt-1   0.0222  0.0325  0.0436  0.0442   
     (0.29)   (0.43)  (0.57)   (0.58)   
        
ΔlnCPFCt-2   0.1329+  0.1426* 0.1329*  0.1546*   
     (1.91)   (2.05)  (2.19)   (2.20)  
    
ΔlnRRTAXt-1     0.0009  0.0010  0.0037  0.0035          
     (0.14)   (0.14)  (0.44)  (0.43)    
        
ΔlnRRTAXt-2     0.0050  0.0050  0.0076   0.0074   
     (0.68)   (0.68)   (0.90)   (0.89)    
    
ΔlnRPITt-1   -1.1485** -1.1703** -1.1764** -1.1724**  
               (-2.66)   (-2.72) (-2.72)   (-2.72)  
     
ΔlnRPITt -2   0.7690  0.7780  0.7833  0.7829         
     (1.20)   (1.22)  (1.23)   (1.22)      
Adjusted R2     .4208    .4247    .4228    .4229     
S.E.    0.0184  0.0183  0.0183  0.0183  
VECLM(1)     25.28    25.40     26.01    26.31   
VECLM(8)     24.79    24.66    23.04    23.29   
 
Unit Root Tests (1958:q1-2009:q4) 
Level (SIC lag 5% Critical 1% Critical 
in parentheses)           level for lag    level for lag 
lnCPFC  -2.986601    (5) -3.431576 -4.002786 
ΔlnCPFC  -4.778380** (4) -3.431576 -4.002786 
lnAaaTR10  -6.357207** (0) -3.431576 -4.002786 
lnRRTAX  -0.036425    (1) -3.431682 -4.003005 
ΔlnRRTAX  -12.91896** (3)  -3.431789 -4.003226 
lnRPIT    0.213507    (6) -2.875262 -3.461783 
ΔlnRPIT  -3.071184*   (5)  -2.875898 -3.461783 
Notes:.+,*and **) denotes significant at the 90% , 95%, and 99% level respectively.  t-statistics in parentheses.  A lag 
length of 9 minimized the AIC, and yielded clean residuals and unique, significant vectors allowing time trends in the 
variables. Lag lengths for unit root tests are based on the SIC. Constant and trend significant and included in tests for 
lnCPFC and lnRRTAX; for tests of lnRPIT  the constant was significant and included, whereas the trend was 
insignificant and omitted. Coefficients on lags of difference terms longer than t-2 are omitted to conserve space. 

Table 2: Monthly Models of the Change in the Commercial Paper-Bank Loan Mix 
(All sample periods start in 2001:02) 
  
                 Using Business Bank Loan-CP Mix                       Using Business and Consumer Bank Loan-CP Mix 
End of  
Sample: 2008:10 2010:03 2010:03 2010:03 2008: 10 2010:03 2010:03 2010:03 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
constant 0.6726  -3.0504 -2.5819 -1.8172 -1.4665 -2.2215 -2.6403 -2.6507 
  (0.37)  (-1.45)  (-1.34)  (-1.11)  (-0.79)  (-1.06)  (-1.31)  (-1.53) 
 
ATR10t-1 -0.7355+ -0.2462 -1.4021* -1.1919* -0.4450 -0.0811 -1.1962* -0.9832*  
  (-1.85)  (-0.53)  (-2.59)  (-2.59)  (-1.06)  (-0.18)  (-2.18)  (-2.09)  
 
ATR10t-2 0.2175  0.5519  0.2812  0.2696  0.1573  0.6384  0.4473  0.4292  
  (0.54)  (1.20)  (0.56)  (0.64)  (0.38)  (1.41)  (0.89)  (1.00)  
 
ATR10t-3 -0.9082* -1.4868** -1.7856** -1.8156** -0.6469+ -1.2276** -1.4430** -1.4756**  
  (-2.51)  (-3.84)  (-3.96)  (-4.76)  (-1.67)  (-3.12)  (-3.17)  (-3.77)  
 
(FP*ATR10)t-1    1.9840* 3.1540**      1.9026* 2.9841** 
      (2.60)  (4.70)      (2.51)  (4.43) 
 
(FP*ATR10)t-2    0.6154  -0.1025      0.4601  0.2193 
      (0.66)  (-0.13)      (0.50)  (0.27) 
 
(FP*ATR10)t-3    1.2455  0.5618       0.9033  0.2745 
      (1.65)  (0.87)      (1.19)  (0.41) 
 
LINVISMt (1-4) 0.1818 0.7903  0.6595  0.4625  0.3646  0.5457  0.6477  0.6542 
LISMt (5-8)   (0.39)  (1.42)  (1.30)  (1.08)  (0.77)  (1.02)  (1.26)  (1.48) 
 
Aug9t  -3.6315**  -3.6830**  -3.5243** -3.6214** -3.6157** -3.5696** -3.4713** -3.5680** 
  (-9.23)   (-5.70) (-5.89)   (-7.15)  (-8.84)  (-5.64)  (-5.80)  (-6.94) 
  
Lehmant -2.5413**  -2.7519**  -2.4720** -2.5461** -2.3591** -2.4384** -2.2649** -2.3273** 
  (-6.41)   (-4.25) (-4.11)   (-5.00)  (-5.64)  (-3.83)  (-3.74)  (-4.47) 
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TED t-1 -0.4195+ -0.3297 -0.1788 -0.4893* -0.3577 -0.2300 -0.1251 -0.4268+ 
  (-1.93)   (-1.23)  (-0.64)  (-2.04)  (-1.58)   (-0.87)  (-0.45)  (-1.75) 
  
TALF t-1       2.5175**       2.4162** 
        (6.36)        (6.02) 
 
F-Test all     3.46*    5.09**   9.48**  12.41**    1.27   3.33*     5.38**  6.75**  
three lags of 
(ATR10)t-i                
 
F-Test all        6.48**  11.45**      5.02**  9.30**  
three lags of 
(FP*ATR10)t-i                
R2(corrected) .595  .338  .432  .594  .555  .320  .392  .552 
S.E.  0.3847  0.6364  0.5894  0.4985  0.3999  0.6235  0.5896  0.5062 
LM(2)    0.17    2.64    2.52    0.05    0.40    1.68    1.59    0.38 
Q(4)    4.60  18.41**  22.07**    8.77+    5.13  16.75**  18.83**    6.88 
Q(12)   15.22  23.72*  28.32**             12.01  17.32   23.68*  26.49**  13.40 
 
t-statistics in parentheses. *(**,+) significant at the 5- (1-, 10-) percent level.  
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Table 3: Monthly Models of the Change in the Commercial Paper-Bank Loan Mix Using Aaa-Treasury Spread 
(All sample periods start in 2001:02) 
  
                 Using Business Bank Loan-CP Mix                       Using Business and Consumer Bank Loan-CP Mix 
End of  
Sample: 2008:10 2010:03 2010:03 2010:03 2008: 10 2010:03 2010:03 2010:03 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
constant 0.0191  -3.0343 --2.8637 -1.9841 -2.0138 -2.7939 -4.0604+ -4.5127* 
  (0.01)  (-1.42)  (-1.39)  (-1.09)  (-1.14)  (-1.35)  (-1.96)  (-2.43) 
 
AaaTR10t-1 -0.8395* -0.7861 -1.3443* -1.1902* -0.6664+ -0.6298 -1.2222* -1.0469*  
  (-2.33)  (-1.52)  (-2.47)  (-2.46)  (-1.81)  (-1.25)  (-2.31)  (-2.22)   
 
AaaTR10t-2 0.4601  0.6977  0.4866  0.5116  0.3652  0.7884  0.6223  0.6332   
  (1.26)  (1.40)  (0.89)  (1.05)  (0.97)  (1.61)  (1.17)  (1.34)  
 
AaaTR10t-3 -0.7821* -1.2694** -1.4477** -1.4934** -0.5751+ -0.9776** -1.1362** -1.1881**  
  (-2.32)  (-2.70)  (-3.90)  (-4.80)  (-1.76)  (-3.43)  (-3.12)  (-3.86)  
 
(FP*AaaTR10)t-1    1.9064+ 4.4495**      2.0857* 4.3792** 
      (1.73)  (4.09)      (2.03)  (4.22) 
 
(FP*AaaTR10)t-2    1.1448  -0.0011      0.8629  0.2535 
      (0.99)  (-0.00)      (1.16)  (0.24) 
 
(FP*AaaTR10)t-3    1.4437  0.3146       0.7386  0.2281 
      (1.29)  (0.31)      (0.59)  (0.23) 
 
LINVISMt (1-4) -0.0116 0.7857  0.7354  0.5079  0.5027  0.6911  1.0106+ 1.1286* 
LISMt (5-8)   (-0.02) (1.39)  (1.36)  (1.06)  (1.12)  (1.31)  (1.92)  (2.39) 
 
Aug9t  -3.6533**  -3.6515**  -3.5799** -3.6673** -3.6068** -3.5254** -3.5030** -3.5884** 
  (-9.29)   (-5.52) (-5.63)   (-6.51)  (-8.93)  (-5.49)  (-5.67)  (-6.55) 
 
 Lehmant -2.5658**  -2.6757**  -2.5115** -2.5794** -2.3299** -2.3198** -2.2164** -2.2499** 
  (-6.50)   (-4.03) (-3.93)   (-4.56)  (-5.65)  (-3.57)  (-3.55)  (-4.06) 
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TED t-1 -0.4190* -0.1969 -0.1640 -0.4694+ -0.3199 -0.1017 -0.0857 -0.3920 
  (-2.00)   (-0.78)  (-0.61)  (-1.93)  (-1.48)   (-0.41)  (-0.33)  (-1.65) 
 
TALF t-1       2.4159**       2.3299** 
        (5.31)        (5.29) 
 
F-Test all     3.25*    3.13*  5.03**  5.96**    1.75    1.94  3.32*  3.67*  
three lags of 
(AaaTR10)t-i                
 
F-Test all       3.61*  8.01**      3.87*  8.64** 
three lags of 
(FP*AaaTR10)t-i                
R2(corrected) .593  .303  .354  .493  .563  .294  .349  .489 
S.E.  0.3860  0.6529  0.6285  0.5567  0.3967  0.6354  0.6102  0.5408 
LM(2)    0.36    3.63    1.48    0.34    0.42    2.74    2.33    0.06 
Q(4)    5.90  20.59**  22.48**    8.93+    5.70  19.83**  20.98**    8.64+ 
Q(12)   20.07+  27.25*  28.65**             13.65  20.74+  28.49**  27.71**  15.65 
t-statistics in parentheses. *(**,+) significant at the 5- (1-, 10-) percent level.  
 
  
 
 
